+ 1 203 432 6158Research
Publications, Working Papers & Work in Progress
More information, citations, etc can be found on my Google Scholar page and my SSRN Author page.Background Risk and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion
Optimal Control of an Epidemic through Social Distancing
Limits Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning
Revise and Resubmit at Econometrica
Optimal Auctions for Dual Risk Averse Bidders: Myerson meets Yaari
Revise and Resubmit at the Review of Economic Studies
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
Revise and Resubmit in Econometrica
Overconfidence and Prejudice
Progressive Participation
Identifying Procrastination from the Timing of Choices
Revise and Resubmit at the American Economic Review
The Cost of Information
Revise and Resubmit at the American Economics Review
Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
Revise and Resubmit at the Review of Economic Studies
The Wald Problem and the Equivalence of Sequential Sampling and Static Information Costs
Working Paper on SSRNNever, Ever Getting Started: On Prospect Theory without Commitment
Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals
Risk-Taking in Contests - The impact of fund-manager Compensation on Investor Welfare
An Experimental Test of Groupthink
A Flow Approach to Dynamic Mechanism Design
A Direct Test for Regret Aversion in Dynamic Contexts
Learning with Informational Externalities
Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model
Accepted in Proceedings of National Academy of Science
From Blackwell Dominance in Large Samples to Renyi Divergences and Back Again
Accepted in Econometrica, September 2020
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations
Acceepted at the Journal of Political Economy, August 2020
Rational Groupthink
Accepted at the Quarterly Journal of Economics
Convergence in Misspecified Learning Models with Endogenous Actions
Accepted in Theoretical Economics
Bitcoin: An Impossibility Theorem for Proof-of-Work based Protocols
Accepted in American Economic Review : Insights
Turning Up the Heat: The Demoralizing Effect of Competition in Contests
Journal of Political Economy, May 2020
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions
Journal of the European Economic Association, December 2019
Working Paper on SSRN - Post on the blog of the 5th Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting - Blogpost on voxeu.org
Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise
Journal of Political Economy, May 2020
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices
American Economic Review, December 2018
An Inverse Optimal Stopping Problem for Diffusions
Mathematics of Operations Research, September 2018
Published Paper - Working Paper on SSRN - Working Paper on arxiv
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning
Econometrica, August 2018
Active Learning with a Misspecified Prior
Theoretical Economics, September 2017
Published Paper - Working Paper on SSRN - Top 20 most read TE article in 2017/2018
Expectation-Based Loss Aversion and Strategic Interaction
Games and Economic Behavior, June 2017
Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand
Management Science, June 2017
Continuous Time Contests with Private Information
Mathematics of Operations Research, August 2016
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs
Journal of Economic Theory, September 2015
Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach
Journal of Economic Theory, September 2015
Optimal Stopping With Private Information
Journal of Economic Theory, September 2015
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
Economics and Computation, June 2015
Finite, integrable and bounded time embeddings for diffusions
Bernoulli, May 2015
Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context
American Economic Review, April 2015
Published Paper - Working Paper on SSRN - A discussion by Kevin Bryan - Winner of the 2013 SCOR/EGRIE Award
Deadlines in Stochastic Contests
Journal of Mathematical Economics, May 2014
Gambling in Contests
Journal of Economic Theory, September 2013
Skorokhod Embeddings in Bounded Time
Stochastics And Dynamics, September 2011
Working Papers
Work in Progress
Accepted, Forthcoming and Published Articles
CSEC Major and Office Hour
Computer Science and Economics Major
- Information about the CSEC major can be found here.
- You can subscribe to the CSEC mailing list here
- The guidelines for writing a senior project can be found here
- You can submit a request for an exemption here
Office Hours
My office hours are Wednesdays from 1:15-2:15 via zoom. Please let me know in advance via email if you plan to visit the office hour.Presentations
Presentations by me or a coauthor
- May 25 2018
- ITAM
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations presented by Philipp Strack - May 24 2018
- CIDE
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations presented by Philipp Strack - April 14 2018
- Columbia Theory Conference
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations presented by Philipp Strack - April 13 2018
- Indiana
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations presented by Philipp Strack - April 10 2018
- Stanford (Mechanism Design Reading Group)
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations presented by Philipp Strack - April 6 2018
- Columbia Berkeley OR Conference
A Worst Case Analysis for Bandits presented by Philipp Strack - Mar 1 2018
- NYU
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 12 2018
- California Institute of Technology
Turning Up the Heat: The Demoralizing Effect of Competition in Contests presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 10 2018
- California Institute of Technology
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Dec 14 2017
- University of Gothenburg
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Dec 13 2017
- Norwegian School of Economics Bergen
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Dec 10 2017
- Minnesota
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Dec 4 2017
- Rice
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Dec 2 2017
- ASU Theory conference
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 25 2017
- Collegio Alberto Turin
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 24 2017
- Bocconi, Milan
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - 28 Sep 2017
- Berkeley Theory/Psych and Econ
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - 17 Jul 2017
- Regensburg
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - 27 Jun 2017
- Briq Bonn
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 26 2017
- University of California San Diego
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 10 2017
- Arizon State University
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Dec 1 2016
- Princeton
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Nov 29 2016
- Princeton
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Nov 21 2016
- Columbia University
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Nov 7 2016
- Duke University
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 29 2016
- Oxford
Risk-Taking in Contests - The impact of fund-manager Compensation on Investor Welfare presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 27 2016
- Warwick
Risk-Taking in Contests - The impact of fund-manager Compensation on Investor Welfare presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 26 2016
- University College London
Risk-Taking in Contests - The impact of fund-manager Compensation on Investor Welfare presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 25 2016
- University of Surrey
Risk-Taking in Contests - The impact of fund-manager Compensation on Investor Welfare presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 20 2016
- Northwestern University
Risk-Taking in Contests - The impact of fund-manager Compensation on Investor Welfare presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 23 2016
- Washington University St. Louis
Competition and Endogenous Risk-Taking in Financial Markets presented by Philipp Strack - Nov 17 2015
- University of Chicago
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 26 2015
- USC
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 26 2015
- Stanford
Competition and Endogenous Risk-Taking in Financial Markets presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 16 2015
- Simons Center Berkeley
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 1 2015
- Penn State
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 17 2015
- University of Pittsburgh
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 15 2015
- UPenn
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Jul 15 2015
- University of Bonn
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Jun 9 2015
- University of Jena
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 8 2015
- Stanford
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Philipp Strack - Mar 27 2015
- University of Michigan
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Philipp Strack - Mar 4 2015
- Santa Clara University
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 2015
- AEA Meeting Boston
Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context presented by Sebastian Ebert - Jan 3 2015
- AEA Meeting Boston
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Nov 18 2014
- University of Montreal
On the Speed of Social Learning presented by Philipp Strack - Nov 9 2014
- INFORMS Annual Meeting 2014, San Francisco
Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown Demand: Name-Your-Own-Price presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 7 2014
- UC Davis
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 30 2014
- Berkeley Psych and Econ
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 4 2014
- Berkeley Risk Seminar
Competition and Endogenous Risk-Taking in Financial Markets presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 4 2014
- Harvard/MIT Theory Seminar
Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sampling presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 4 2014
- Chicago
Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sampling presented by Tomasz Strzalecki - May 11 2014
- SITE Meeting 2014, Stanford
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning presented by Botond Koszegi - May 10 2014
- SITE Meeting 2014, Stanford
Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sampling presented by Philipp Strack - May 10 2014
- POMS Conference, Altlanta
Dynamic Allocation and Learning with Strategic Arrivals presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 14 2014
- MIT Sloan Operations Management Seminar
Dynamic Allocation and Learning with Strategic Arrivals presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 12 2014
- Ludwig Maximilians University Munich, Germany
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Paul Viefers - Jan 17 2014
- University Laval, Montreal Canada
Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions presented by Paul Viefers - Dez 12 2013
- University of Bonn
Risktaking and Financial Competition presented by Philipp Strack - 12/04/13
- Yale University
Risktaking and Financial Competition presented by Philipp Strack - Nov 11 2013
- University of Montreal
Risktaking and Financial Competition presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 23 2013
- Max Planck Institute, Bonn
Risktaking and Financial Competition presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 24 2013
- University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 23 2013
- Duke University
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 17 2013
- University of Toronto, Toronto
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 15 2013
- University of Texas, Austin
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Aug 29 2013
- Microsoft Research New England, Boston
Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach presented by Philipp Strack - Aug 23 2013
- MIT Applied Theory Summer Camp
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Aug 16 2013
- Microsoft Research New England, Boston
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 25 2013
- University of Warwick, Statistics Departement
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 9 2013
- University of Bielefeld, Germany
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 11 2013
- Northwestern University, Evanston
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 7 2013
- University of California, Los Angeles
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 5 2013
- Columbia University,Business School
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 4 2013
- Columbia University, Economics Department
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 1 2013
- University of California, Berkeley
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 30 2013
- New York University
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 24 2013
- California Institute of Technology
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 18 2013
- Harvard University
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 16 2013
- University College London
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Jan 15 2013
- University of Warwick
Optimal Stopping with Private Information presented by Philipp Strack - Dez 3 2012
- University of Chicago
Dynamic Revenue Maximization a Continuous Time Approach presented by Dirk Bergemann - Nov 9 2012
- European Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society 2012, Konstanz
Continuous Time Contests presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 29 2012
- University of Cologne
Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 16 2012
- INFORMS Annual Meeting 2012, Phoenix
Dynamic Revenue Maximization a Continuous Time Approach presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 9 2012
- Yale University
Dynamic Implementability for Optimal Stopping presented by Philipp Strack - Oct 4 2012
- University of Maastricht
Dynamic Implementability for Optimal Stopping presented by Philipp Strack - Aug 2012
- 27th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association Malaga
Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context presented by Philipp Strack - Jun 20 2012
- Fourth Congress of the Game Theory Society 2012 Istanbul
Continuous Time Contests presented by Philipp Strack - May 23 2012
- Maastricht University
Continuous Time Contests presented by Christian Seel - Apr 20 2012
- Mannheim University
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 10 2012
- Berlin Behavioral Economics Workshop
Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 2 2012
- Finance Seminar, University of Bonn
Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context presented by Sebastian Ebert - Jan 11 2012
- University of Bonn
How to Sell an Option presented by Philipp Strack - Sep 9 2011
- Mannheim University
Continuous Time Contests presented by Christian Seel - Sep 6 2011
- Verein fuer Sozialpolitik, Jahrestagung 2011
Gambling in Contests presented by Christian Seel - July 19 2011
- Stochastic and Real World Models Conference 2011 (Bielefeld)
Skorokhod Embeddings in Bounded Time presented by Stefan Ankirchner - July 12 2011
- International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University New York
Continuous Time Contests presented by Philipp Strack - June 2011
- Philipps-University Marburg
Skorokhod Embeddings in Bounded Time presented by Stefan Ankirchner - April 27 2011
- Yale University
Continuous Time Contests presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 24 2011
- IMPACT-Workshop, Berlin University
Skorokhod Embeddings in Bounded Time presented by Stefan Ankirchner - Feb 15 2011
- Yale University
Gambling in Contests presented by Philipp Strack - Feb 2 2011
- Maastricht University
Gambling in Contests presented by Christian Seel - Jan 7 2011
- AEA Meeting Denver
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs presented by Paul Heidhues - Nov 2010
- Brownbag Seminar, University of Cologne
Gambling in Dynamic Contests presented by Christian Seel - Oct 28 2010
- Brownbag Seminar, University of Frankfurt
Continuous Time Contests presented by Christian Seel - Oct 20 2010
- SFB Conference, University of Bonn
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs presented by Sven Rady - Oct 10 2010
- University of Jena
Skorokhod Embeddings in Bounded Time presented by Stefan Ankirchner - Sep 11 2010
- Workshop on Stochastic Games, Erice
Gambling in Dynamic Contests presented by Christian Seel - Aug 17 2010
- World Congress of the Econometric Society 2010, Shanghai
Gambling in Dynamic Contests presented by Philipp Strack - May 11 2010
- Mathematics Department University of Bonn
Gambling in Dynamic Contests presented by Philipp Strack - Apr 21 2010
- Economics Department University of Bonn (Microworkshop)
Continuous Time Contests presented by Christian Seel - Apr 1 2010
- Yale University
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs presented by Sven Rady - Mar 15 2010
- University of California, Berkeley
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs presented by Paul Heidhues - Mar 19 2010
- Economics Department University of Barcelona (EDP Jamboree 2010)
Gambling in Dynamic Contests presented by Christian Seel - Dez 1 2009
- Economics Department University of Bielefeld
Gambling in Dynamic Contests presented by Christian Seel - Jul 8 2009
- Economics Department University of Bonn (Microworkshop)
Gambling in Dynamic Contests presented by Philipp Strack
Research Statement
Download my research statement as PDF file
Research Statement: Philipp Strack
I am a microeconomic theorist interested in how people behave and interact in dynamic situations. My research explores questions of mechanism design, learning, dynamic non-expected utility models and contests.
Learning and the Timing of Decisions: Consider a customer who chooses between two products. Is she more likely to pick the product which maximizes her utility when she chooses quickly? Fudenberg, Strack & Strzalecki (2016) study the correlation between the timing of decisions and their likelihood of being correct. We find that in a sequential sampling model (Wald, 1947), where the difference between the utilities of the choices is ex-ante unknown, quick choices are on average more likely to be correct. This provides an explanation for the common empirical finding that quick decisions tend to be better in experiments (cf. Swensson, 1972; Luce, 1986; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008).
Learning under Misspecification: How do economic agents with misspecified beliefs learn? Consider, for example, an agent who is overconfident about her own ability and observes the output of her team. As she overestimates her own productivity, she will be disappointed by the team's output and thus tend to think that her team mates are of lower ability than they truly are. Heidhues, Koszegi & Strack (2016) show that this miss-inference caused by the agent's overconfidence is self-reinforcing and drives her beliefs systematically away from the truth. The ability to learn consequently harms overconfident agents as learning leads them to worse decisions. In Fudenberg, Romanyuk & Strack (2016), we characterize long-run beliefs and actions for general misspecified beliefs under a Binomial prior.
Social Learning: Economic agents often do not only learn from their own experience. A customer could learn about the quality of a product by observing other customers' choices. In Harel, Mossel, Strack & Tamuz (2016), we explore how rational agents learn from the actions of others who face similar decision problems. We show that only a small fraction of the original private information can be learned from actions. This result implies that decentralized information aggregation with rational agents will fail in many contexts and provides a justification for institutions that aggregate information. Heidhues, Rady & Strack (2015) show that communication through cheap talk messages can sometimes incentivize efficient information acquisition and transmission.
Mechanism Design: Many contracts - like phone contracts, gym memberships, repeated procurement auctions - govern long-term relationships. The recent literature in dynamic mechanism design studies how to structure such long-term contracts in order to maximize a given objective like social welfare or revenue. In Kruse & Strack (2015, 2016a), we derive optimal contracts for irreversible investment and general optimal stopping problems. In Bergemann & Strack (2015, 2016), we explore optimal contracts for repeated sales and procurement situations. Gershkov, Moldovanu & Strack (2016) derive a revenue maximizing sales mechanism when buyers arrive stochastically and time their purchase strategically. In Strack & Kruse (2016b), we want to analyze under what circumstances local incentive compatibility conditions imply global incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design problems. Fu, Immorlica, Lucier & Strack (2015) consider the optimal design of a static auction when the designer does not know the distributions of the bidders' valuations and takes a worst case approach.
Dynamic Behavioral Models: While expected utility (EU) is well understood in a static as well as in a dynamic context, a lot of research on non-EU preferences has focused on static contexts. Ebert & Strack (2015) consider an extension of prospect theory (PT) to the dynamic context. We find that a naive PT decision maker without commitment will never stop gambling, which predicts that she will always go bankrupt in a casino and never sell a stock even if it is profitable to do so immediately. In contrast, Ebert & Strack (2016) show that a sophisticated PT decision maker without commitment will never start gambling, i.e. will behave like an infinitely risk-averse EU agent. Viefers & Strack (2016a,b) explore anticipated regret (Lomes & Sugden, 1982) in a dynamic model both analytically and experimentally. We find that subjects are reluctant to accept an offer below the best past offer and show that this is consistent with the minimization of anticipated regret.
Contests: Many economic situations take the form of a contest. As fund managers' compensation mainly depends on their relative performance, they should behave as if they were competing in a contest. Strack (2016) studies the competition between fund managers in a dynamic financial market model à la Black Scholes. The paper proves that in equilibrium, fund managers use inefficiently risky investment strategies. The more competitive the managed fund market becomes, the larger the resulting welfare loss. As in 2013, 46.3% of US households held investments into managed funds valued at 17.1 trillion US dollars, this excessive risk-taking is clearly relevant for social welfare. Seel & Strack (2013, 2015) develop a novel continuous time contest model where contestants learn about their own performance over time, but not about their competitors' performance, and can dynamically decide when to stop exerting effort. Lang, Seel and Strack (2014) study the role of deadlines in such a dynamic contest model.
Teaching
Spring 2018
ECON 206 -- Mechanism Design & Agency Theory
All information about the class can be found on its bcourses page.Fall 2017
ECON 459 -- Behavioral Mechanisms
I am visiting Yale in the Fall 2017 and will be teaching the class ECON 459 on "Behavioral Mechanism Design and Institutions". All information about the class is available on Yale canvas: https://yale.instructure.com/courses/32048Spring 2017
C103 -- Introduction to Mathematical Economics, Mechanism Design
- All information about the class can be found on its bcourses page.
- Please address all questions regarding the class to mathematicaleconomicsc103@gmail.com.
- Office Hour is held by Cristian Ugarte on Friday's 12-3PM, 630 Evans.
ECON 206 -- Mechanism Design & Agency Theory
All information about the class can be found on its bcourses page.Curriculum Vitae
Positions
- Jul. 2019 - present
- Yale University, New Haven, USA
Associate Professor - Jul. 2018 - Jun. 2019
- UC Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
Associate Professor - Jul. 2014 - Jun. 2018
- UC Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
Assistant Professor - Jul. 2013 - Jul. 2014
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Microsoft Research New England, Boston, USA
Postdoctoral Researcher
Education
- 2011 - present
-
Bonn International Graduate School of Mathematics (BIGS), Bonn, Germany
Ph.D student in Mathematics supervised by Professor Stefan Ankirchner - 2008 - 2013
- Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn, Germany
Ph.D. in Economics supervised by Professor Paul Heidhues - 2004 - 2010
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University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Diplom in Mathematics - 2004 - 2009
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University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Diplom in Economics
Associate Editor
Mathematics of Operations Rearch and AEJ:MicroReferee
Econometrica, American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, International Economic Review, Journal of the European Economic Association, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Economic Inquiry, Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, Operations Research, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Games and Economic Behaviour, Economics and Computation, Mathematics of Operations ResearchHonors
- 2019
- Sloan Fellowship in Economics
- 2015
- 40 under 40 by Capital magazine
- 2013
- "Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in the Dynamic Context" wins the SCOR/EGRIE Award
- 2012
- Scholarship of the German Federal Bank (Stipendiat der Dt. Bundesbank) 2012
- 2012
- Recipient of the first JEEA Excellence in Refereeing Award 2012
- 2008-2012
- Scholarship of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics
- 2008-2011
- PhD Scholarship of the Foundation of German Business (Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft)
- 2008
- Scholarship of the Nippon Carl Duisberg Foundation financing a stay at the Takushoku University
- 2004-2008
- Scholarship of the Foundation of German Business (Stiftung der Deutschen Wirtschaft)
- 2002-2004
- FFF (Foerdern Fordern Forschen) scholarship for highly gifted scholars from the University of Bonn
